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COMMENTS
SUBJECTS INCLUDED WITHIN MANAGEMENT'S
DUTY TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
With the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of
1935, Congress, in order to eliminate certain causes of substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce, adopted the practice of collective bargaining as the policy of the United States
for the prevention and adjustment of labor disputes.' The theory
of the act as stated by the Supreme Court is "that free opportunity for negotation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about
the adjustments and agreements which the act itself does not
'2
attempt to compel."
The collective bargaining process essentially provides a forum
in which the actions of management are subject to challenge by
the union acting for the employees whose services are necessary
if the business is to function successfully. The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) promotes the use of this forum by subjecting both the employer and the representative of his employees to certain remedial actions if they refuse to bargain collectively. This Comment is concerned, however, only with the
collective bargaining obligation imposed upon management.
Section 8 (a) (5) of the act enunciates the employer's duty to
bargain in negative terms:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ...

to

refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees." 8
Congress' efforts to define collective bargaining resulted in section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act which states:
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as reenacted, 61 Stat. 136 (1947); as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-164 (Supp. IV, 1963).
2. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937).
3. Section 8(5) of the original National Labor Relations Act was carried
forward as section 8(a) (5) in the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat.
141, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1958) [hereinafter cited as section 8(a) (5) of the
act]. An identical obligation to bargain collectively has been imposed upon the
employees acting through a union by section 8(b) (3) of the act. For an excellent discussion on the history of section 8(a) (5), see Comments, 32 FORDHAM L.
REV. 557 (1964) ; 14 LAB. L.J. 297 (1963) ; Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Board and Collective Bargaining, 57 MIcH. L. RaV. 807 (1959) ; Comment,
30 TEN. L. REV. 543 (1963).
[6303
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"[T] o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested

by either party, but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession

....

-"4 (Emphasis added.)

The purpose of this Comment is to discover which employer activities, motivated without union animus,5 are included within
the statutory obligation to bargain collectively.
EMPLOYER'S DILEMMA

The NLRA provides that collective bargaining is concerned
with wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. In interpreting this language, the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.6 recognized
three categories of bargaining subjects - illegal, mandatory, and
4. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1958). When Congress originally
adopted collective bargaining as a national policy for prevention and settlement
of labor disputes, it failed to enumerate expressly what actions and subjects fell
within the obligation to bargain. The task of defining the term was left to the
National Labor Relations Board and the reviewing courts, who gradually arrived
at a meaningful definition of the conduct required by the parties to meet their
statutory obligation to bargain. Regarding management this definition was subjective based upon the entire course of its conduct, with the essential ingredient
that although the employer is not compelled to agree to the union's proposals,
he must approach the bargaining table in good faith. In 1947 Congress undertook to define collective bargaining. The original bill passed by the House of
Representatives restricted the area of compulsory negotiation to certain enumerated
subjects. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947). However, the Senate amended the bill to omit the specific lists. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 34 (1947). Thus Congress couched the definition in the broad
terms of section 8(d).
5. It must be remembered that the obligation to bargain collectively is not
the only duty imposed upon management by the NLRA. The employer is also
prohibited from restraining or coercing his employees in regard to their rights
under § 8(a) (1) of the act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1958) ;
from dominating or interfering with the union, § 8(a) (2) of the act, 49 Stat. 452
(1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1958); and from discriminating against any
labor organization to encourage or discourage membership, § 8(a) (3) of the act,
49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958). This Comment, however,
is limited to a discussion of management activity which does not violate any of
these provisions. This is necessary because employer conduct in refusing to bargain collectively which would not normally violate § 8(a) (5) will generally constitute an 8(a) (5) unfair labor practice if such conduct is based upon union
animus. In such situations the Board usually finds the employer has violated one
of the §§8(a) (1) through 8(a)(3), plu8 §8(a)(5).
6. 356 U.S. 342 (1948).
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voluntary. The legal consequences of this classification are such

that it is of utmost importance that an employer determine the
category of each bargaining subject.

There has been relatively little trouble concerning the illegal
category. These subjects have been referred to as the "Elliot
Ness or vestal virgin type subjects, untouchable and beyond
reach ' 7 because neither party may collectively bargain concern-

ing them without committing an unfair labor practice. Subjects
may fall within this category because either they cannot be included within the collective bargaining agreement or they must
be included within the collective bargaining agreement. Examples of the former are closed shop agreements," agreements to
pay for work not performed," or clauses limiting the union's

exclusive bargaining authority. 10 But a union recognition clause
is a nonbargainable subject because an employer must, upon
request, include it within the contract."
The Supreme Court declared that all subjects which fall within the language of section 8 (d), "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment," are considered mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.1 2 Upon request of either party,
the employer and the representative of his employees must col-

lectively bargain concerning all such subjects, and refusal to do
so generally constitutes a violation of section 8(a) (5)

of the

7. Address by John J. Adams, Conference on Recent Developments in Labor
aw, Washington, D.C., October 4, 1963.

8. Section 8(a) (3) impliedly bans preferential hiring and closed shops. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NIRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951), enforcing in part and remanding in part, 86 N.L.IR.B. 951 (1949), held the union committed an unfair labor practice when it insisted upon a closed shop provision
within the collective bargaining agreement. However, a hiring hall is not illegal
if not discriminatory. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
9. Agreements to pay for work not performed violate § 8(b) (6) of the act.
However, this § 8(b) (6) has been given a restricted interpretation by the Court
and so long as work is actually being performed it is not in violation of the act
to bargain on this subject. American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB,
345 U.S. 100 (1953), affirming in part, 193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951). Arguably,
however, any agreement violating the NLRA may not be bargained. NLRB v.
News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961).
10. Extent of recognition may not be bargained away. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
89 N.LR.B. 341 (1950).
11. NLRB v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 130 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1942), enforcing,
37 N.L.R.B. 260 (1941); Simplicity Pattern Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1283 (1953).
Recognition of a union is not a bargainable issue; thus an employer who refuses
to recognize a local union while suggesting he might enter into a contract with
the union's international or another local thereof shall be deemed to have violated
section 8(a) (5).

12. NLRB v. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958) ; see Comments, 64 CoLum. L.
REv. 294 (1964) ; 32 FORDHAM L. REv. 557 (1964), 52 GFo. L,J. 366 (1964),
52 GEO. L.J. 379 (1964), 14 LAn. L.J. 297 (1963).
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act. 13 However, neither party is obliged to yield its position;
thus an employer or a union may, in good faith, insist upon its
proposal concerning a mandatory subject to the point of an impasse in negotiations.
The voluntary or permissive category contains every subject
that is neither illegal nor mandatory. Either party may raise
a permissive subject and request the other to bargain and the
other may then negotiate on that subject if it so desires, but refusal to bargain does not constitute a violation of the act. The
Supreme Court has stated, however, that since neither party is
required to bargain such a subject, insistence upon such a subject to the point of impasse in negotiations will constitute an
14
unfair labor practice.
The employer's dilemma is that he must not insist, even in
good faith, upon a voluntary subject to the point of impasse in
negotiations or as a condition precedent to agreement on other
subjects; on the other hand, the employer must not refuse, even
in good faith, to bargain concerning a mandatory subject. Obviously, a well-advised employer will attempt to ascertain whether
a certain subject is mandatory or voluntary. Unfortunately,
there is no sharp line of demarcation between the mandatory
and voluntary categories. This problem has been complicated by
the recent expansion of the mandatory category to include areas
long thought to be completely within the realm of management
discretion and, therefore, voluntary subjects. As a result of this
expansion, the employer who relies on past decisions may discover that the subject has been shifted from one category to
another. 15 Furthermore, management is not safe in relying upon
the fact that the particular subject has never before been raised
during the collective bargaining process. Even though the Board
is undoubtedly influenced to some extent by employer-employee
customs and bargaining history, the fact that the subject is
''new" to collective bargaining does not prevent the Board from
ruling that it falls within the mandatory obligation to bargain.16
13. There are certain situations when an employer's refusal to bargain concerning a mandatory subject will not violate the act, the most common occurring
when the union has expressly or impliedly waived its right to bargain. See text
accompanying notes 55, 57 infra.
14. NLRB v. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
15. General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962), modifying to three years
the contract ban rule which formerly was two years. Town & Country Mfg. Co.,
136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), unlike previous Board decisions, required the employer
to bargain his decision to subcontract work performed by his employees rather
than the effects of the decision.
16. Weyerhauser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949).
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Although there still remain some subjects which are considered voluntary or permissive, 17 the mandatory classification has
been extended to include almost every conceivable activity, exceptional as well as routine, which even minutely affects wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.' 8 Further17. The following subjects or activities have been held to be voluntary: Selection of negotiators as to either size or membership of team, American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (19,53) ; insistence upon a contract clause outlining legal liability, Radiator Specialty Co. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d
495 (4th Cir. 1964) ; employer's proposal that the signature of each affected
employee be required before a grievance could be processed, Industrial Union of
Marine & Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963) ; indemnity bonds, Arlington Asphalt Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 742 (1962), enforced, 318 F.2d
550 (4th Cir. 19f33) ; industry promotion fund where union has not voluntarily
agreed to such, Raleigh Water Heater Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 769 (1962), enforced, 317 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1963) ; unsolved grievances, Knight Morley Corp.,
116 N.L.R.B. 140 (1956), enforced, 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957); companyowned housing where the rates are normal and the employees are not pressured
to live therein, Bemis Brothers Bag Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 728 (1951), enf. denied,
206 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1953) ; union desire that the employer establish a security
fund for the payment of wages, Excello Dry Wall Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 663 (1963) ;
employer's demand to extend the liability for violation of a no-strike clause to
the full resources of the Local's parent international, North Carolina Furniture,
Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 41 (1958) ; employer's demand that the union withdraw certain unfair labor practice charges, Lion Oil Co. v. NLRB, 245 F.2d 376 (8th
Cir. 1957) ; strike vote clause providing the employees must vote whether to
accept or reject the employer's final offer before the union can call a strike,
Cranston Print Works Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 537 (1956) ; certain internal union
matters such as the composition of the employees' shop committee, Iron Casting,
Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 739 (1955) ; possible informal dismissal of unfair labor practice charges, Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1507 (1951).
18. The following subjects have been held to be mandatory: management
rights clauses are mandatory subjects in that an employer may insist to an impasse upon their inclusion unless the insistence was otherwise in bad faith, NLRB
v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) ; holidays and vacations, Singer
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 595 (1941) ; hiring halls are a mandatory subject
if non-discriminatory, NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Ass'd General Contractors,
349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965); bulletin boards, Proof Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 309
(1956); enforced, 242 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1957); compulsory retirement, McMullans v. Kansas, Okla. & Gulf R.R., 129 F. Supp. 157, aff'd, 229 F.2d 50
(10th Cir. 1956); stock purchase plan, Richfield Oil Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 356
(1954), enforced, 231 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; relief, Fry Roofing Co. v.
NLRB, 220 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1955) ; no-strike clauses, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954); rates of pay, piece rates, and other
incentive pay, NLRB v. East Texas Steel Castings Co., 211 F.2d 813 (5th Cir.
1954); profit sharing, NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir.
1954) ; union security and checkoff, NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d
131 (1st Cir. 1953) ; housing, mandatory where it is company owned and the rates
are low, NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953) ;
changes required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, NLRB v. Harris, 200 F.2d
656 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Christmas and Easter bonus, Automobile Workers Local
405 v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952) ; group health and
accident insurance, Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949) ; imposition of compulsory retirement age, Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th
Cir. 1948) ; individual merit raises, NLRB v. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th
Cir. 1948) ; methods of payments, General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 150 F.2d 201
(3d Cir. 1945) ; hours of work, South Carolina Granite Co. v. NLRB, ent. 8ub
nom., NLRB v. Blair Quarries, Inc., 152 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1945) ; overtime,
NLRB v. Moench Tanning Co., 121 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1941); seniority rights,
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more, continuation of the current trend would expand even further the mandatory classification to include many more subjects
now thought to be within the province of employer discretion.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The most sweeping innovations and precedent-shattering reinterpretations of labor law occurring recently have concerned
management's statutory obligation to bargain collectively. Unfortunately, these decisions by the Board and the reviewing
courts have become so inextricably interwoven that it is difficult
for management to chart a legal course through the maze.
The recent developments lend themselves most readily to a
discussion based upon various classifications of subjects, such
as subcontracting, automation, relocation, and termination of
the business enterprise. Each classification is discussed chronologically within itself. Furthermore, certain principles, applicable to all classifications, are discussed in the initial classification although the facts of the cases might place them in later
groupings.
Discussion of the recent developments begins with subcontracting since the rationale of the initial subcontracting decisions provided the impetus to propel the collective bargaining
process into many other areas previously considered management prerogatives.
MANAGEMENT SUBCONTRACTING DECISIONS

Subcontracting is an excellent example of the Board's incorporation of what was once a voluntary bargaining subject
NLRB v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 120 F.2d 1004 (3d Cir. 1941) ; freedom
from discriminatory discharge, NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir.
1941); safety rules, Gulf Power Co., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (1966); changes in
working conditions and schedules, Hilton Mobile Homes, 155 N.L.R.B. No. 57
(1965); tax-withholding practices, Orange County Machine Works, 147 N.L.R.B.
1004 (1964) ; employee discount, Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1407
(1962) ; agency shop, General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961) ; contract
duration, United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 357 (1960); paid
coffee break, Fleming Mfg. Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 452 (1957) ; transfer of employees,
Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953); pensions, Acme
Brick Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 173 (1952) ; wages to union leaders for time spent on
union business, Betty Brooks Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1952) ; Phelps Dodge Copper Products, 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952) ; stock bonus, United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1951) ; layoffs, United States Gypsum Co., 94 N.L.R.B.
112 (1951) ; price of meals furnished employees, Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 672 (1949) ; lunch and wash-up periods, National Grinding Wheel Co.,
75 N.L.R.B. 905 (1948); contract interpretation, administration and modification, Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943) ; reinstatement of
strikers, Washougal Woolen Mills, 23 N.L.R.B. 1 (1940).
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into the category of mandatory subjects. 19 When Fibreboard
PaperProd.Corp.2 0 first appeared, the Board held that if a decision to subcontract work presently being performed by one's

employees was occasioned solely by economic considerations, the
employer was only obligated to bargain concerning the effects
21
of the change upon the terms and conditions of employment.
The employer was obligated to bargain his decision to subcon-

tract his operations only if such decision was prompted by antiunion motives.2 2 Just one year later, however, the Board, in
Town & Country Mfg. Co., 23 asserted that the employer's unilateral action in subcontracting work, even if based upon purely

economic considerations, constituted an unlawful refusal to bargain because the employer is under a statutory obligation to
bargain concerning his decision to subcontract. On the basis of
this decision, the Board, on rehearing, reversed its original hold24
and ordered the employer to bargain his
ing in Fibreboard
decision to subcontract maintenance work even though the decision had been motivated by economic considerations alone. The
Board in the Town & Country and Fibreboard decisions enun19. For a related discussion of subcontracting, see Note, 25 LA. L. REv. 940
(1965).
20. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), affirming
sub nom., East Bay Union Machinists v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
enforcing, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), reversing, 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961). The
employer, motivated solely by economic considerations, determined that $250,000
could be saved annually by contracting out work presently being performed by its
maintenance employees. At the time, however, the employer was bound by a collective bargaining agreement with the union. As the expiration date of the agreement approached, the employer was uncooperative in scheduling a meeting with
the union for the purpose of negotiating a new contract. Finally, four days before
the collective bargaining agreement was to expire, the employer informed the
union of its decision to subcontract the maintenance work. The employer assumed
that it was not obligated to bargain with respect to its economic decision to subcontract work, and further assumed it would be pointless to negotiate a new contract with employees whose employment would terminate upon expiration of the
existing contrAct.
21. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd, 127
N.L.R.B. 212 (1960) ; Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 130 N.L.R.B.
1558 (1961) ; Krantz Wire & Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 971 (1952).
22. As discussed in note 5 supra, the Board will generally find the employer
has refu4ed to bargain collectively whenever his activities are based upon antiunion motives; however, the significance of the 8(a) (5) violation is minimized
due to the fact that the employer was found guilty of other unfair labor practices. The Board has found an 8(a) (5) refusal to bargain when the employer
relocated. his plant without bargaining the decision, Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127
N.L.R.B. 212 (1960), or modified his operations without bargaining the decision, Rives Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 772 (1959), when his purpose was to discourage
union membership or to avoid his collective bargaining duty with the representative of his employees.
23. Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced,
316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
24. 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962).
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ciated a theory which would resound in all subsequent decisions
in this area and which would later force an employer to bargain
many other subjects thought to be solely within management
discretion. The Board declared that "candid discussion of mutual problems by labor and management frequently results in
their resolution with attendant benefit to both sides. Business
operation may profitably continue and jobs may be preserved.
Such prior discussion with a duly designated bargaining representative is all that the Act contemplates. But it commands
25
no less."
The Board's decision in Fibreboard that an employer must
bargain his decision to subcontract seemed extremely broad, as
it contained no language of limitation; thus, it could have been
interpreted as obligating an employer to negotiate every decision
to subcontract work which had any effect upon his employees.
However, subsequent Board decisions limited the scope of Fibreboard. Even prior to the Supreme Court decision in Fibreboard,
the Board held, in Motorsearch Co., 26 that the employer had not
violated the act by failing to bargain with the union over the
decision to subcontract because the union knew of the subcontracting and had made no attempt to bargain about it during
eighteen consecutive bargaining sessions. Further, in Shell Oil
Co. 27 the Board held that the employer did not violate the act
by failing to bargain with the union before subcontracting employees' work because the subcontracting clause in the collective
bargaining agreement by implication permitted the employer to
subcontract occasional maintenance work without prior notice
and consultation with the union.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
2
the Board's decision in Fibreboard
without limitation, stating
"it is not necessary that it be likely or probable that the union
yield or supply a feasible solution but rather that the union be
afforded an opportunity to meet management's legitimate complaints." 9 However, other appellate courts were reluctant to
25. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 (1962),
citing Town & Country Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027 (1962).
26. 138 N.L.R.B. .490, 51 L.R.R.M. 1240 (1962).
27. 149 N.L.R.B. 283, 57 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1964) ; see General Motors Corp.,
149 N.L.R.B. 396, 57 L.R.R.M. 1277 (1964) ; Shell Chemical Co., 149 N.L.R.B.
298, 57 L.R.R.M. 1275 (1964).
28. 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
29. Id. at 414.
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adopt the Board's position.3o Specifically, in NLRB v. Adams
Dairy,31 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit apparently
repudiated the Board's final decision in Fibreboardby announcing that the decision on the part of the employer to terminate
a phase of his business and to subcontract the distribution of
all products through independent contractors was not a required
subject of collective bargaining. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Fibreboard to establish uniformity and eliminate
3 2
the conflicts and confusion existing among the various circuits.
The majority of the Supreme Court in Fibreboardaffirmed
the appellate court's decision, holding that "contracting out" is
within the literal meaning of the phrase "terms and other conditions of employment" and was, therefore, a statutory or mandatory subject of collective bargaining.3 3 The Court followed
the doctrine enunciated by the Board decisions in Town & Country and Fibreboardthat the possible mitigation, through collective bargaining, of the adverse effects of any activity affecting
employees is sufficient justification for subjecting that activity
to the collective bargaining process. 34 Significantly, however,
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that its decision was limited
to the facts of the case- the replacement of the employees in
the existing bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment.s 5
It seems that the Court's cautious pronouncement that the
decision was limited to the facts of the case evidences a desire to
refrain from labeling subcontracting per se a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; on the other hand, it is obvious
that under certain circumstances subcontracting will fall within
the mandatory category. 6 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court,
30. In Hawaii Meat Co. v. NL.RB, 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963), the court
held the employer had not committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain concerning his decision to subcontract since the decision was made while the
union was engaged in a strike. The court stressed that the employer's general
right to replace economic strikers eliminated the necessity to bargain.
31. 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963).
32. 375 U.S. 963 (1964).
33. 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964).
34. Id. at 214 (1964).
35. The court declared that "our decision need not and does not encompass
the other forms of 'contracting out' or 'subcontracting' which arise daily in our
complex economy." Id. at 215 (1964). This desire to limit the holding was reemphasized by the concurring Justices who apparently feared the majority opinion
might be misunderstood.
36. The Fibreboard doctrine definitely obliges management to negotiate deci-

19661

COMMENTS

in exercising care to place its holding within the narrowest possible confines, suggested no concrete guidelines for ascertaining
when management would be obligated to bargain concerning its
subcontracting decisions. The majority only asserted that under
the facts of Fibreboard "to require the employer to bargain
about the matter would not significantly abridge his freedom
to manage the business. ' 37 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Stewart, alarmed at the implied breadth of the majority opinion,
attempted to provide some guidelines as to which subjects should
fall within the phrase "terms and other conditions of employment." 38 Yet he was only able to distinguish between managerial
decisions "which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control . . .
which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate
enterprise or which impinge only indirectly on employment security,"3 9 and those decisions which are "in themselves primarily
about conditions of employment. ' 40 Presumably, therefore, the
Supreme Court left the Board and the reviewing courts free to
determine the guidelines applicable to the doctrine announced in
Fibreboard.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.41 was the first Board decision
to interpret the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard. Although agreeing that generally the contracting-out of work being
performed or capable of being performed by employees within
a bargaining unit is a subject of mandatory bargaining, the
Board stated that Fibreboard was not intended to establish a
rigid rule to be mechanically applied regardless of the relevant
facts. On the basis of the cumulative facts in Westinghouse, the
Board held that the employer did not have to give notice to, or
consult, the union with respect to subcontracting the work in
question. 42 The Board reasoned that the Fibreboard doctrine
sions to subcontract work (a) previously performed by employees within the
bargaining unit, and (b) the work continues to be performed in the same general
manner on the employer's premises. Some appellate courts, however, have limited application of the doctrine to these pertinent facts.
37. 379 U.S. 203, 213 (1964).
38. Id. at 223.
39. bid.
40. Ibid.
41. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Mansfield Plant), 150 N.L.R.B. No. 136,
58 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1965).
42. The facts of Westinghouse reveal that the recurring subcontracts were motivated solely by economic considerations, that they comported with the traditional
methods by which the employer conducted his business operations, that they did
not during the period in question vary significantly in kind or degree from previously established practice in the plant, that they had no demonstrable adverse
impact on the employees within the bargaining unit, and that the union had the
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was meant to apply only if subcontracting departed from previously established operating procedure, effected a change in
conditions of employment, or resulted in a significant impairment of job tenure, employment security, or reasonably anticipated work opportunities for those in the bargaining unit. It is
submitted that as far as the Board is concerned, Westinghouse
established that the Fibreboard doctrine was not to be limited
solely to its facts; rather, Fibreboardprecipitated a doctrine of
broad application requiring management to bargain collectively
its proposed decisions to subcontract unless the facts of the
particular case grant dispensation.
Subsequent Board decisions have relied upon Westinghouse
and have upheld its general principles. Special emphasis has
been placed on the findings that the subcontracting did not constitute a significant detriment to the employees within the bargaining unit and that the employer was following an established
practice of unilateral subcontracting which the union had neither
protested nor attempted to limit. 48 In General Tube Co.4 4 the
Board held that, though the evidence was insufficient to show
a previously established practice of subcontracting, the employer
did not violate the act by refusing to bargain with respect to its
decision to subcontract because the decision did not result in any
significant detriment to the employees within the bargaining
unit or change their employment conditions.
In summary, it appears that although the Board intends to
grant the Fibreboarddoctrine broad application, it nevertheless
evidences a desire to create some limited exceptions. A careful
reading of the Board decisions reveals some clearly ascertainable guidelines concerning management's obligation to negotiate
its subcontracting decisions.
Unfortunately for the formulation of guidelines, but fortunately from the viewpoint of management, the various appellate
courts seem to be enforcing a more restrained application of
Fibreboard. At this writing there have been three important
opportunity to bargain about changes in the existing subcontracting practices
at general negotiating meetings.
43. See American Oil Co. (Pittsburgh, Pa.), 155 N.L.R.B. No. 64, 60 L.R.R.M.
1369 (1965); American Oil Co. (Neodesha, Kans.), 152 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 59

L.R.R.M. 1007 (1965) ; American Oil Co. (Whiting, Ind.), 151 N.L.R.B. No. 45,
58 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1965) ; Fafnir Bearing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 58 L.R.R.M.
1397 (1965); Superior Coach Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 58 L.R.R.M. 1369
(1965); Kennecott Copper Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 57 L.R.R.M. 1217
(1964).
44. General Tube Co. & Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 151 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (1965)

1966]

COMMENTS

decisions by two courts of appeals determining the proper ap45
plication of Fibreboard,all overruling the Board.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard,the
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit in NLRB v. Adams
Dairy" had announced that a management decision to terminate
a phase of its business and subcontract the distribution of all
products through independent contractors was not a required
subject of collective bargaining. Subsequent to and in light of
the final decision in Fibreboard,the Eighth Circuit reconsidered
its original holding. It concluded that its original decision was
correct, 47 finding that Adams was distinguishable from Fibreboard and thus withdrawn from the ambit of the Fibreboard
doctrine which was restricted to its facts according to the majority opinion.
The distinguishing feature was that in Adams Dairy, unlike
Fibreboard,there was a change in the basic operational procedure. In Fibreboardthe subcontracted maintenance work was
still performed in the plant and no capital investment was contemplated. The employer simply replaced the existing employees
with those of an independent contractor who performed the
same work under similar conditions of employment. On the
other hand, in Adams Dairy, the employer completely altered
his distribution system when he decided to sell his products to
independent contractors. The trucks formerly used to deliver the
goods were sold to the independent contractors who became
solely responsible for selling the product. Further, the work
performed by the independent contractors in Adams, contrary
45. Two of these appellate court decisions involved a management decision
to partially terminate its business operations without subcontracting the terminated work. Although these decisions rightfully fall within the classification
Partial and Total Termination of the Business Operations (infra), it is submitted
that the deducible principles should be equally applicable to the area of subcontracting.

46. 322 F.2d 553

(8th Cir. 1963)

(see text accompanying note 31 supra),

vacated by the Supreme Court, 379 U.S. 644 (1965).
47. 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965). The employer and the union entered into
three contracts over a period of time. In each negotiation the employer rejected
the union's proposal concerning the inclusion of a clause in the contract prohibiting substitution of independent contractors on company routes. In 1959, the
employer initiated a series of meetings to discuss the unfavorable competitive
situation created by the lower costs of other dairies. The average earnings for
Adams driver-salesmen were $14,495 per year for a 30-38 hour average work
week. When no agreement could be reached, the employer informed the union of
his decision to subcontract the work and that all positions of the driver-salesmen

were terminated.
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to the situation in Fibreboard,was not primarily performed for
the benefit of the employer. The court stated that in Adams
there was more than the mere substitution of one set of employees for another; there was a change in the capital structure
which resulted in a partial liquidation and recoupment of capital
investment. To require management to bargain concerning its
decision to close out the distribution aspect of its business operation would have significantly abridged its freedom to manage
48
its own affairs.

This desire of the Eighth Circuit to limit the scope of the
Fibreboard doctrine was again evidenced in NLRB v. Burns
Int'l Detective Agency. 49 Seizing upon the language in Fibreboard that it was limited to its facts, the court held that partial
discontinuance of the business operations without prior bargaining was not a violation of section 8 (a) (5) because, unlike Fibreboard,. the employer was not continuing the same work at the
same plant under similar conditions of employment.50 No form
of contracting-out or subcontracting was involved; the employer
48. 350 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1965). It should be noted that the court of
appeals relied upon the language of the majority in Fibreboard that under the
facts of Fibreboard "to require the employer to bargain about the matter would
not significantly abridge his freedom to manage his business." 379 U.S. 203, 213
(1964).
In addition, the appellate court asserted that even if the decision to subcontract the distribution of the dairy products was subject to the mandatory bargaining obligation, it was arguable that such bargaining occurred. In Fibreboard
the employer's decision to subcontract arose during negotiations for a new labormanagement contract and thus there was little excuse for not negotiating the
disputed issue during the bargaining sessions. However, in Adams Dairy, management's decision to subcontract arose when the labor-management contract still
had two years before expiration. The facts implied that negotiation on the disputed issue had occurred before the current contract was perfected. That being
the case, the court stated that the employer should not be required to reopen negotiations during the contract period.
49. 148 N.L.R.B. 1267, enf. part., den. part., 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965).
The employer had contracts for guard service with Creighton University and
several other business concerns in Omaha, Nebraska. Within a year prior to the
certification of the International Guards Union of America as the bargaining representative for all of Burns' Omaha employees, every business concern in Omaha
except Creighton University cancelled its contract for guard service. Less than
a month after certification, the employer notified the union that he was terminating the contract with Creighton University, leaving no guard service in Omaha,
and consequently, no need to bargain with the union. The union alleged that the
mere refusal to consult with them concerning termination of the Creighton University contract, irrespective of the economic situation, constituted a violation of
section 8(a) (5). The Board agreed and again demonstrated its desire for a
broad application of the Fibreboarddoctrine.
50. Again the appellate court is relying upon language utilized by both the
majority and concurring Justices in Fibreboard that the decision was limited to
its facts, that is, the replacement of "employees in the existing bargaining unit
with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment." 379 U.S. 203, 213, 218 (1965).

1966]

COMMENTS

had, for valid economic reasons, completely discontinued its operations at one of its plants, and no one else was performing
for the employer, whether by subcontract or otherwise, the services formerly rendered by its employees.
In Royal Plating & Polishing Co.5 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit displayed a similar desire to limit the Fibreboard doctrine. The Board had ruled that the employer's economically determined decision to partially terminate his busi-

ness operations was subject to the collective bargaining obligation. However, the appellate court simply distinguished Royal
Plating on its facts from Fibreboard and found that the Fibreboard doctrine did not apply. Unlike Fibreboard,the employer's
economic decision in Royal Plating involved the commitment of
investment capital and was, therefore, a managerial decision
52
which lay at the core of entrepreneurial control.
51. 148 N.L.R.B. 545, 57 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1964), reconsidered, 152 N.L.R.B.
No. 76, 59 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1965), enforcement denied, 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir.
19li5). The employer's business activities were located in two plants within the
same city which constituted a single bargaining unit. During negotiation for a
new labor-management contract, the employer notified the union that he was losing
money and therefore would close the plant rather than increase wages. Nevertheless, a new contract was consummated. During these contract negotiations,, the
employer had also been negotiating with the Newark Housing Authority concerning the sale of one of the plants to the Authority. The employer's negotiations with the Housing Authority were not purely voluntary; the Authority could
force a sale through the use of its condemnation powers and in fact made an
offer to the employer which informed him that if he wished more money he would
have to go to court. Subsequent to the new contract between management and
the union, the employer agreed to sell the plant to the Authority. The union
was never notified of the decision. The employer began laying off all of the
employees and subsequently completely closed the plant in question.
The Board applied the Fibreboarddoctrine to a partial closing of the business
operation even though there was no subcontracting of work presently being performed by the employees within the bargaining unit. The Board stated that the
fact that the decision to partially terminate was purely economically motivated
was unimportant, in fact, under the Fibreboard doctrine, it makes a decision to
shut down even more amenable to the procedures of collective bargaining. This
decision is an excellent example of the extent to which the Board desires to apply
Fibreboard.
The court of appeals, however, held that an employer who was faced with
either moving or consolidating his business operations for economic reasons has
no duty under § 8(a) (5) to bargain with the union respecting his decision to
close one of his plants. Possibly the appellate court was influenced by the fact
that management's negotiations with the Housing Authority were not purely
voluntary; under these circumstances there was no room for union negotiations.
Nevertheless, the court held that management was under an obligation to notify
the union of its intentions after the decision was perfected so the union could
be granted an opportunity to bargain concerning the rights of the employees whose
employment status would be altered. Thus the effects of the decision must still
be negotiated.
52. The Third Circuit utilized the language of the concurring Justices in
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It appears that these two courts of appeals intend to enforce
a more restricted application of the Fibreboard doctrine than
that of the Board, by distinguishing the decisions on the facts
or by deciding that the employer's activity was a managerial
decision which lay at the core of entrepreneurial control or that
bargaining such a decision would significantly abridge the employer's freedom to manage his own business affairs.
On the basis of these recent decisions by the Board and the

reviewing courts the rapidly changing area of law concerning
subcontracting may be summarized, at present, as follows: Management must collectively bargain all decisions to subcontract
which are prompted by union animus.53 Furthermore, management must collectively bargain all purely economic decisions to
subcontract unless :54
(a) there is an implied waiver of management's obligation
to bargain in light of previously established procedure
involving subcontracting which the union did not protest, 55
Fibreboard who were fearful that the majority opinion radiated implications of
disturbing breadth: "Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as
imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions which
lie at the core of entrepreneurial control." 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964).
53. See note 22 supra. See NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th
Cir. 1965)..
54. Carmichael Floor Covering Co., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 60 L.R.R.M. 1364
(1965) ; Spun-Jee Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 59 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1965).
55. This exception was enunciated in Motorsearch Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 1490
(1962), in which the Board held that management had not violated the act by
failing to bargain with the union concerning its decision to subcontract because
the union knew of the subcontracting and made no attempt to bargain about it
during eighteen consecutive bargaining sessions. It was later re-emphasized in
NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963); White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 60 L.Rt.R.M. 1147 (1965); American Oil
(Neodesha, Kans.), 152 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 59 L.R.R.M. 1007 (1965) ; Central Soya
Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 161, 58 L.R.R.M. 1667 (1965) ; Allied Chemical Corp.,
151 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 58 L.R.R.M. 1480 (1965); American Oil Co. (Whiting,
Ind.), 151 N.L.R.B. No. 45, 58 L.R.R.M. 1412 (1965) ; Fafnir Bearing Co., 151
N.L.R.B. No. 40, 58 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1965) ; Superior Coach Corp., 151 N.L.R.B.
No. 24, 58 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1965) ; Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. No.
136, 58 L.R.R.M. 1257 (1965) ; Kennecott Copper Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 169,
57 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1964).
In Transmarine Navigation Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 59 L.R.R.M. 1232
(1965), management attempted to rely on Motorsearch alleging that the union was
charged with knowledge of the closing of the terminal because a company vice
president informed a union member of the fact and therefore the union waived
its right to bargain concerning the closing. The Board held, however, that when
a union is advised of an employer's final decision with respect to a matter that
should be bargained, it is not incumbent on the union to make a useless request
to negotiate something which has effectively already been accowplieh,, AthQvpgh
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(b) the subcontract does not constitute a significant detriment to the employees within the bargaining unit, 56
(c) there is an express or implied waiver of the employer's
this case dealt with termination of the employer's business operations, its principle is equally applicable to any phase of the Fibreboard doctrine.
56. This exception was clearly announced in the Westinghouse decision (see
text accompanying footnotes 4142 supra) ; it has also been applied in American
Oil (Neodesha, Kans.) ; Central Soya; American Oil (Whiting, lnd.) ; Kennecott Copper; Superior Coach; Fafnir Bearing; and Allied Chemical (see note 55
supra). These later decisions placed special emphasis on the fact that the subcontracting did not constitute a significant detriment to the employees within
the bargaining unit (exception b) and the employer was following an established
practice of unilateral subcontracting which the union had neither protested nor
attempted to limit (exception a). However, the General Tube decision asserted
that exception b alone is sufficient to protect management from an unfair labor
practice charge. Query: What would the Board hold when an employer's unilateral decision to subcontract was in accord with previously established practice
but constituted a significant detriment to the employees within the bargaining
unit? It is suggested that General Tube stands for the proposition that fulfillment of either exception a or b alone is sufficient to protect the employer. Indeed,
in White Consol. Indus., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 60 L.R.R.M. 1147 (1965), the
employer decided to discontinue its Chicago operations and move to Pennsylvania,
obviously a decision which would constitute a significant detriment to the employees within the bargaining unit. The Board, citing Fibreboard and Motorsearch, held there was no violation of 8(a) (5) because the union was notified
after the decision was reached and they made no objections to the employer's
plans or requested bargaining with respect to the decision ; the union waited six
months before it even filed 8(a) (5) charges. Although this case dealt with
closure of operations, the extracted principle should be equally applicable to subcontracting. Thus it appears that macre acquiescence in management's decision
by the union is sufficient to protect management from 8(a) (5) violations even
though the decision constitutes a significant detriment to the employees within
the bargaining unit.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Bettis Atomic Power Lab.), 153 N.L.R.B. No.
33, 59 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1965), involved a determination of what constitutes a
.significant detriment." There was no subcontracting clause in the collective bargaining agreement; consequently the employer unilaterally awarded fifteen subcontracts dealing with matters such as painting and cleaning. The union alleged
violation of 8(a) (5) because the employer failed to bargain his decision and the
employees within the bargaining unit had performed similar work in the past.
The Board found that the employer had not violated the act, reiterating that
Fibreboard was not intended to lay down a hard and fast doctrine as to unilateral
subcontracting and even where a subject of mandatory bargaining is involved,
there may be circumstances which the Board would accept as justifying unilateral
action. The employer's obligation to bargain does not normally arise unless the
subcontract effects some change in the terms and conditions of employment of
the employees involved. The Board asserted that "significant detriment to the
employees in the appropriate unit" is not to be found by speculative reasoning;
the Board refused to adopt the General Counsel's contention that if the work
had not been subcontracted, then the employees laid-off two years before the
subcontracting occurred could have been recalled. Member McCulloch dissented,
asserting that because of the unilateral subcontracting, the laid-off employees
suffered a significant detriment in that they were deprived of a "reasonably
anticipated" right to be recalled to perform the subcontracted work. McCulloch
relied on the Vestinghouse (Mansfield) decision in which the Board reasoned
that the Fibreboarddoctrine applied if the subcontracting resulted in a significant
impairment of reasonably anticipated work opportunities for those in the bargaining unit.
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obligation to bargain through the terms of the collective
57
bargaining agreement,
(d)

the employer, in order to meet his obligations, is forced
to contract out the work normally performed by his em58
ployees because they are engaged in an economic strike,

57. See General Motors Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 57 L.R.R.M. 1277 (1964),
in which the Board determined that management had not violated the act by
transferring employees from one unit to another without prior bargaining because
the decision was essentially a change of method without resulting in layoff or
discharge and was a management prerogative recognized 'by the union in its
national collective bargaining agreement. In Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 22,
57 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1964), the Board held that management did not violate the
act by failing to bargain with the union before subcontracting its employees' work
because the subcontracting clause in the collective bargaining agreement implied
consent that the employer could subcontract occasional maintenance work without
prior notice to, or consultation with, the union. See Druwhit Metals Prod. Co.,
153 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 59 L.R.R.M. 1359 (1965) ; Shell Chemical Co., 149 N.L.R.B.
No. 23, 57 L.R.R.M. 1275 (1964).
In relation to both exceptions a and c, in the absence of a specific waiver of
bargaining rights on a particular subject, the Board will not readily infer an
implied waiver of the right to bargain on a mandatory subject. The implied
waiver must be clear and unmistakable. NLRB v. Item Co., 220 F.2d 956 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955) ; Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing
Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958) ; Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B.
1096 (1949). Normally the union does not waive its right to bargain upon a
subject simply by entering into a collective bargaining agreement which is silent
on the subject. NLRB v. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. den.,
335 U.S. 814 (1948). Thus, a management rights clause does not amount to a
waiver of the obligation to bargain on a subject not expressly covered by the
collective bargaining agreement. If a union willingly waives its rights to bargain
on a certain subject, the employer will not be required to negotiate on the subject
during the period of the waiver. Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 283 (1964).
58. See Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963), in which,
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard, the court of appeals held
that the employer had not committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to
bargain concerning his decision to subcontract since the decision was perfected
while the union was engaged in a strike. Subsequent to the Supreme Court's
decision in Fibreboard, the exception has been upheld in NLRB v. Abbott Publishing Co., 331 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1964). See also Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B.
283, 57 L.R.R.M. 1271 (1964), in which the Board held that management was
not obligated to bargain over subcontracts made in the course of a strike as
these temporary subcontracts necessitated by the strike did not transcend the
reasonable measures an employer may take in order to maintain operations in
such circumstances; Shell Chemical Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 57 L.R.R.M. 1275
(1964). In Empire Terminal Warehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1965), the
Board held that management did not violate the act by failing to notify and consult with the union prior to subcontracting unit work during a strike because:
(a) the subcontracting was prompted by request of the employer's customers,
not by the employer's desire to have other persons perform his employees' work;
the subcontracting was instituted solely as a temporary measure to continue
the business relationship with his customers; (b) throughout the dispute the
employer continued to bargain in good faith with the union concerning contract
terms in general and the subcontracting issue in particular; the employer did
not attempt to undermine the union, rather, he continued to recognize the union
as the representative of the strikers and their replacements; and (c) despite
the subcontracting, the employer did not eliminate, permanently or otherwise, any
union jobs or otherwise alter or impair the bargaining unit; the subcontracting did
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under the facts of the case, application of the collective
bargaining obligation to management's decision to subcontract would constitute an unfair burden upon management which would significantly abridge its freedom
to manage the business,5 9

(f) the decision to subcontract was a managerial decision which lay at the core of entrepreneurial control, 60
or
(g) the facts of the case are so distinguishable from Fibreboard as to remove it from the ambit of that doctrine.,"
Even though management's decision to subcontract may fall
within one of the exceptions to the Fibreboard doctrine and
thereby exempt it from the collective bargaining obligation, it
nevertheless appears that management must negotiate, upon
not exceed what was necessary to protect the employer's customers whose deliveries were in jeopardy.
59. Although subcontracting is generally a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining, the Fibreboard doctrine did not categorically make subcontracting
per se a mandatory subject. There are definitely some circumstances which justify
unilateral action on the part of management in this area. NLRB v. Burns Int'l
Detective Agency suggests that unilateral managerial action will be justified if it
falls within this exception. See text accompanying notes 49, 50 supra.
60. This exception was enunciated by Royal Plating d Polishing Co. (see text
accompanying notes 51, 52 supra).
61. See NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated,
379 U.S. 644 (1965); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897
(8th Cir. 1965) ; Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 545, 57 L.R.R.M.
1006 (1964), reconsidered, 152 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 59 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1965),
enforcement denied, 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
Admittedly any distinction between exceptions e, f, and g is indeed tenuous
and elusive. However, it is suggested that perhaps a distinction may be drawn.
It is submitted that management decisions concerning certain activities should
be exempt from the collective bargaining obligation simply on the basis that they
are managerial decisions lying at the core of entrepreneurial control (exception f),
rather than because the facts of the case happen to be distinguishable from
Fibreboard. Examples of such activities are decisions concerning the volume and
kind of advertising expenditures, product design, method of financing, sales procedure, and investment of capital.
The fact that application of the collective bargaining obligation to management's decision concerning certain activities would significantly abridge its freedom
to manage the business (exception e) should exclude all of the management
activities excluded by exception f; however, it should also exclude certain employer
activities not normally covered by exception f which arise due to the circumstances. Examples of such decisions are those perfected during an economic
strike, during periods of emergency, during periods when a great number of
employees or union personnel are absent, or - most important of all - when the
employer's very existence as an entrepreneur depends upon a prompt and timely
decision concerning the subcontracting of work.
Lastly, exception g should only be applied to situations which could not be
excluded from the collective bargaining obligation under exception e or f but
the facts of the case demand that the employer be free to make a decision unfettered by the collective bargaining obligation.
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request, with its employees concerning the effects of such deci2
sion.
It is believed that these exceptions are too general and enigmatic to provide management with a highly reliable guide. Unless management is certain its decision to subcontract lies outside the duty to bargain - for instance, because the facts of its
case are a replica of a case already decided -it
acts at its
peril 8 in subcontracting work without first negotiating its decision with the collective bargaining representative of the employees involved.
MANAGEMENT

DECISIONS

CONCERNING

PARTIAL OR TOTAL TERMINATION OF BUSINESS OPERATIONS

Even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Work-

ers v. DarlingtonMfg. Co., 4 it was settled that if an employer
partially terminated his business operations due to union animus

it constituted a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. 5
Specifically, if the employer simply threatened to terminate par62. The exceptions to the Fibreboard doctrine merely alleviate management's
obligation to bargain rather than totally extinguishing it. In NLRB v. Royal
Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965) (see notes 51, 52 supra),
the appellate court held that although management had no duty to bargain collectively its decision to close one of its plants, it was obligated to notify the
union of its decision and grant the union an opportunity to bargain concerning
the effects of the decision. See also Young Motor Truck Service, 156 N.L.R.B.
No. 56, 61 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1966) (see note 95 infra). These cases involve a
managerial decision to terminate the business operations rather than to subcontract; however, the principles extracted should apply to any case under the
Fibreboard doctrine.
63. Management should take extreme care not only when the facts surrounding
its proposed decision to subcontract fall within the interstices of the exceptions
to the Fibreboarddoctrine, but also if it appears possible litigation will arise in
a circuit other than those which have enunciated the exceptions.
If management subcontracts without previously engaging the representative
of its employees in collective bargaining concerning the proposed decision, and
later is found to have violated section 8(a) (5) of the act, the remedial actions
available to the Board are harsh indeed. Fibreboard asserted that the nature of
the violation might justify directing the employer to resume its subcontracted
operation and reinstate the terminated employees to employment malhing them
whole for loss of pay. Furthermore, the employer is usually directed to indicate
in writing its adherence to the Board's decision, thereby resulting in a public
confession, and is ordered to cease and desist from unilaterally bargaining unit
work. Spun-Jee Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 96, 59 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1965). Should
the employer fail to comply with the orders levied by the Board or the reviewing
courts, the courts may issue a writ of attachment confining him in custody for
acts of contempt. NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, 354 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1965).
64. 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962), enforcement denied, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.
1963), reversed and remanded, 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
65. This classification of subjects is concerned with managerial decisions to
terminate partially or totally operations at one situs without relocating elsewhere.
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tially the business in order to restrain or coerce his employees
in the exercise of their rights under the act, it was a violation
of section 8 (a) (1).',6 Furthermore, management could not eliminate a portion of the business enterprise due to union animus
because this would constitute discrimination with regard to hire
or tenure and thus be a violation of section 8 (a) (3) .1 Management could not effect a shutdown of the plant and subsequently
reopen it for the purpose of hiring only those employees who
were formerly anti-union ;68 nor could management discharge its
employees for anti-union reasons and allow the work to continue
under new personnel.6 9 In all of the above decisions major emphasis was placed upon the motives of the employer. If the employer's motives were discriminatory or retaliatory or if they
discouraged union membership or were designed to avoid bargaining with the union, then the employer would be guilty not
only of violating 8(a) (1), (2), or (3), but also of violating
section 8 (a) (5).7o There were no decisions, however, that determined whether management could completely terminate its business enterprise due to union animus.
The Board and the reviewing courts were not in complete
accord on whether management could unilaterally, partially or
totally terminate its business enterprise for purely economic
considerations. The Board, through extensions of the Fibreboard
doctrine, had consistently held that such action by management
constituted a violation of the statutory bargaining obligation. 71
66. NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Stokely
Foods v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1952). Presumably management was
also prohibited from threatening to terminate totally the business operations.
67. NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1962).
68. Stokely Foods v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1952). See Norma Mining
Corp., 206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1953) in which it was held that management could
not effect a shutdown of the plant whereby the employees, by renouncing the
union, could cause the plant to reopen.
69. NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940).
70. The Board would weigh the relative strength of the economic and antiunion motivations in order to determine which was the primary cause of the
decision to terminate operations. It should be noted that the presence of a union
can always be considered by the employer as a purely economic factor in motivating his operational change; thus an employer may consider the probability of
higher wages due to unionization as a factor when considering a change in operations. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) ; NLRB
v. Lassing, 126 N.L.R.B. 1041, enforcement denied, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960).
71. In Weingarten Food Center, 140 N.L.R.B. 256 (1962), the alleged
8(a) (5) violation was not properly presented to the trial examiner, therefore
the complaint was dismissed; however, a majority of the Board stated that the
Town & Country doctrine should apply and thereby obligate the employer to bargain collectively before reaching a decision to sell his store. Then in Star Baby
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 678 (1963), the Board, by applying the doctrine announced in
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New York Mirror72 epitomizes the rationale utilized by the
Board: "Town & Country and Fibreboard involved, to be sure,
management decisions to contract out a phase of an operation.
But the principles of these earlier cases have been equally applied to management decisions to take other steps to alter or to
discontinue permanently either a portion or all of an operation
when the decisions have the effect of eliminating unit work.
Thus our decisions in Town & Country and Fibreboard did not
turn on the means whereby, or the extent to which, the employer
terminated operations, but rather on the fact that a management decision 'eliminating unit jobs ...

is a matter within the

statutory phase (sic) other terms and conditions of employment.'
The elimination of unit work is no less within that statutory
phrase when it is to result from a management decision affecting an entire operation. And this is so even though the likelihood is slim that prior consultation with the union will alter the
employer's contemplated decision. For the Act 'at least demands
that the issue be submitted to the mediatory influence of collective bargaining.' ,,73 On the other hand, the various appellate
courts had been almost as consistent in refusing to find an unfair labor practice in those instances where management unilaterally closed its plant partially or totally for purely economic
74

reasons.

75
Such was the complexion of the law when Darlingtonarose.
Darlington Manufacturing Company was a South Carolina Corporation operating one textile mill. A majority of its stock was
Town & Country, found that by unilaterally terminating his business operations
without consulting the union, the employer violated section 8(a) (5) of the Act.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboardbut prior to Darlington,
the Board, in Royal Plating and Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1965), extended the Fibreboard-Town & Country doctrine to include an employer's purely
economic decision to close his plant. See Transmarine Navigation Corp., 152
N.L.R.B. No. 107, 59 L.R.R.M. 1232 (1965) ; Apex Linen Service of Columbus,
Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 58 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1965) ; Lori-Ann, Inc, 137 N.L.R.B.
1099 (1962).
72. 151 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 58 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1965).
73. 151 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 58 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1466 (1965).
74. See NLRB v. New England Web, Inc., 309 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1962) in
which the appellate court stated that a 'businessman retains the untrammeled
prerogative to close his enterprise when in the exercise of a legitimate and justified business judgment he concludes that such step is economically desirable or
economically necessary. NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960). In
NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954), it was stated in
dictum that an employer has an absolute right to terminate its business for any
reason whatsoever. Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.
1940).
75. For further information concerning the law in this area prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Darlington, see Rothman, The Right To Go Out of
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owned by Deering Milliken & Co., a New York "selling house."
Deering Milliken in turn was controlled by Roger Milliken and
other members of his family. When the Textile Workers Union
initiated an organizational campaign at the South Carolina mill,
the company resisted in several ways, including threats to close
the plant if the union won the representation election. 7 When
the union won the election, the Board of Directors, true to its
vow, voted to liquidate the corporation. The plant ceased operations and all plant machinery and equipment were sold piecemeal.
The Board found that the plant had been closed due to the
union animus of Deering Milliken and this constituted a violation of section 8(a) (5).7 Alternatively, the Board determined
that the Darlington plant was merely a single part of the integrated Deering Milliken enterprise, and that Deering Milliken
had violated the act by closing a portion of its business for discriminatory purposes. Significantly, the Board also found an
8(a) (5) violation because Deering Milliken had refused to bargain collectively its decision to completely terminate its operations. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit set aside
the Board's order, holding that even accepting arguendo the
Board's determination that the Deering Milliken enterprise had
the status of a single employer, an employer has an absolute
right to close a portion or all of his business regardless of union
78
animus.
The Supreme Court refused to support the contention of the
Board that since the plant had been closed due to anti-union
considerations, the employer was guilty of an 8(a) (3) violation. 79 The Supreme Court held that an employer has an "absolute right" to terminate his entire business for any reason he
wishes, including union animus. It was felt that the closing of
an entire business, even though discriminatory, ends the employer-employee relationship; on the other hand, a discriminatory partial closing may have repercussions on the remnants of
Business Together With a Consideration of Plant Removal, Subcontracting, and
The Duty to Bargain, 6 BOSTON COLLEGE IND. & CoMm. L. REv. 1 (1965) ;
Comments, 64 COLUMf. L. REV. 294 (1964), 32 FORDIIAm L. REV. 557 (1964),
17 U. FLA. L. REV. 109 (1964), 18 VAND. L. REV. 258 (1964).
76. These threats were determined by the Board to have violated section

8(a) (1) of the act and such decision was not challenged by the employer before
the reviewing courts.
77. 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962).
78. 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
79. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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the business, theireby affording the employer leverage for distouraging the free exercise of employee rights granted by the
act. Therefore, the Court asserted that a partial closing conStitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (3) if done
to "chill unionism" in any of the remaining plants of the single
(ehipioyer and if the employer may reasonably have foreseen that
the closing would have that effect. A partial closing becomes a
lever to discourage collective employee activities in the future
ahd, aS stch, yields an unfair benefit for the employer. But a
complete termination of the business enterprise yields no such
benefit for the employer.8 0
The Court asserted that in order to ascertain whether the
termination was merely a partial closing of a larger single enterprise rather than a total cessation, it is not necessary that there
exist an organizational integration of plants or corporations.
All that is required is that the party exercising control over the
plant being closed for anti-union reasons have an interest in
another business, whether or not engaged in the same line of
commercial activity as the closing plant, of sufficient substantiality to give promise of reaping a benefit from discouragement
of unionism in that business.
The Darlington decision becomes perplexing when one attempts to address the "absolute right" concept to the enigma of
what subjects lie within the ambit of the mandatory bargaining
category. The Supreme Court dealt solely with employer 8 (a) (1)
and 8(a) (3) violations and certainly the "absolute right" concept grants management the right to totally terminate its op80. The case was remanded to the Board to determine the status of the
Milliken enterprise, and should it be deemed a partial closing, the purpose and
reasonable effects of the closing upon the employees in the other plants comprising the Milliken group. As yet there appears to have been no decision on these
issues.
Although the Court, in accord with prior law (see text accompanying note 66
supra), denied that its decision would justify management threatening to close
its plant, it acknowledged that management could announce it reached a decision
to close the plant should the employees vote for the union. It has been suggested
that this gives management another legal weapon to employ in labor-management
economic warfare. The employer can make a "definite decision" and announce it
to the employees. If the employees take the threat seriously and vote against the
union, the definiteness of the managerial decision can never be tested. If the
employees gamble that management is bluffing and vote for the union, the employer will simply continue operations. Although the Board will probably find
that his "decision" was a "threat" and thus an unfair labor practice, its cease
and desist order will be painless. Management will be ordered not to threaten
again, but certainly not to fulfill its "decision." See Summers, Labor Law In The
Supreme Court, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 65 (1965).
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erations without fear of violating these sections of the act. Un-

fortunately, the Supreme Court did not even mention section
8(a) (5) in its opinion. The Board held that the employer vio-

lated section 8 (a) (5) by refusing to negotiate concerning its decision, 1 but this was unnoticed by the Supreme Court. It appears
that Darlington,in spite of the "absolute right" concept, leaves
three questions unanswered: (a) Does the "absolute right" exempt management from bargaining its decision, based upon
union animus, to totally terminate8 2 its operations? (b) Must an
employer bargain his decision to terminate his operations, either
partially or totally, for purely economic reasons? (c) Assuming
arguendo that management, whether motivated by union animus
or not, has an absolute right to terminate its business operations
partially or completely, is management free from its obligation
to bargain concerning the effects83 of its decision?
Subsequent decisions by the Board have announced that

Ddatington granted to manageient nothing more than an '"absolute right" to terminate its entire business operation. Darlington
has n application to a managerial decision to terminate partially
the enterprise; instead, the Fibreboard doctrine is pertinent
since bargaining such a decision may possibly mitigate its adVerse effects upon the employees. In Royal Plating & Polishing
Co.,8

the Board stated that nothing in the Darlington decision

81. It is submitted, however, that the Board's holding may be relegated to &
position of negligible importance owing to the fact that the Board did not rely
upon the principles of Town a Country. The employer was found guilty of an
8(a) 3) violittion, arid, as usuftl, when the managerial acts are so complete a§
to discourage and ultimately thN\art the union from pursuing its right to bargain,
the Board will find the employer guilty not only of the appropriate 8(a) (1)
to
through (3) violation, but also guilty of violating section 8(a) (5) -failure
bargain collectively in good faith. See notes 5, 22 supra.
82. It has already been determined that a unilateral anti-union managerial
decision to terminate partially unit work constitutes a violation of either 8(a) (1),
(2), or (3) (see notes 65-69 supra) ; furthermore, existence of the union animus
is sufficient grounds for the Board to determine there was an 8(a) (5) violation
(see notes 5, 22 supra).
As concerns a unilateral anti-union managerial decision to terminate totally
the operations, Darlington stated there could be no 8(a) (1), (2), or (3) violation. Thus the query: does it constitute a violation of section 8(a) (5) ?
83. it should he remembered that the Board and reviewing courts have continually acknowledged a dichotomy as concerns the collective bargaining obligation : (1) the actual decision, and (2) the effects of that decision. It appears that
management has a greater obligation to negotiate concerning the effects of the
decision than it has to negotiate concerning the actual decision. See note 21 supra
and note 91 infra.
84. 152 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 59 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1965), reconsidering, 148
N.LIR.B, 545, 57 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1964). The facts of this case are stated in
note 51 supra. In its initial decision the Board stated that the Fibreboard doctrine required the employer to bargain collectively before deciding to close his
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forbade requiring management to bargain its decision to terminate partially its business operations, whether the decision was
prompted by economic considerations or union animus. The
Board reasoned that since a decision to terminate partially was
subject to the scrutiny of section 8 (a) (3), it could also be held
subject to the scrutiny of section 8 (a) (5). The "absolute right"
is applicable only where management decides to terminate completely. The Board expressly refused to state whether management must collectively bargain a decision to terminate its enterprise totally, but implied that such a decision may be perfected
unilaterally. Management decisions to totally terminate the operations do not fall within the scrutiny of section 8(a) (3) and
therefore should not fall within the scrutiny of section 8 (a) (5) .85
In Carmichael Floor Covering Co.8 6 the Board again disallowed
application of the Darlington "absolute right" concept, but for
a different reason. It also reiterated and reinforced its extension of the Fibreboarddoctrine to this area of managerial decisions. The employer alleged that his action was legal in light of
Darlington since he had abandoned only one phase of his business operations and there was no evidence of any anti-union
considerations. The Board firmly stated that this reliance upon
Darlington was misplaced. Darlington concerned the issue of
discriminatory motivation and its application, if any, to a partial or total closing of a plant. The issue in the Carmichaelcase,
however, related solely to the employer's statutory duty to bargain; the alleged violation concerned the consequences of failure
to fulfill such duty regardless of the existence of any discriminaplant. After the Supreme Court decided Darlington the Board reconsidered
floyat Platin.; again it was held the employer was under a duty to bargain before
closing the plant.
Weston & Brooker Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1965) is another example of
the broad position taken by the Board in the post-Fibreboard-Darlingtonera.
The employer, motiv*ated purely by economic considerations, unilaterally abolished
a single canteen-air-comnpressor job without prior negotiation. The trial examiner
concluded that the unilateral decision to abolish the job did not have a substantial
adverse effect on unit work and conditions of employment. The Board disagreed
stating that it had a demonstrably adverse impact on the job tenure of at least
one employee within the unit - the one discharged. Furthermore, the Board
asserted the change had an effect upon the other employees within the bargaining
unit: they could no longer charge their purchases in the canteen as they had
previously done; they are now burdened with putting cash -into the vending machines! See also M & A Electric Power Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 39 (1965).
85. The fact that the majority of the Board espoused an implication that the
Darlington "absolute right" concept might not require an employer to bargain
collectively his decision to terminate his entire operations was further substantinited by Member Jenkins' concurring opinion. 152 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 59 L.R.R.M.
1141, 1143 (1965).
86. 155 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 60 L.R.R.M. 1364 (2965).
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tory motivation. ThuS, the controlling principles are to be found
in the Fibreboarddoctrine.
Similarly, courts of appeals from two circuits have agreed
that the Darlingtondecision was concerned solely with the issue
of discriminatory motivation and its application, if any, to a
partial or total closing of the business enterprise. 87 Thus, the
mere absence of anti-union motivation surrounding a managerial
decision has been sufficient to remove the case from the Darlington "absolute right." Once it is determined that the case is dis87. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), on remand from
Supreme Court, 379 U.S. 644, vacating, 322 F.2d 553 (1963). This case has
been partially discussed under Management Subcontracting Decisions (see text
accompanying notes 46-48 8upra). The initial Board decision was rendered prior
to the Supreme Court decision in Fibreboard; when the case reached the Eighth
Circuit for the final hearing, the appellate court thought it advisable to discuss
not only Fibreboard, but also Darlington, which had been rendered in the interval
by the Supreme Court. The appellate court distinguished the partial closing of
employer Adams from that of the employer in Darlington, asserting that the
Supreme Court in Darlington required that the employer's decision be motivated
by a desire to chill unionism in any of his remaining plants and that the employer must have reasonably foreseen that the closing would have such effect. In
Adams Dairy there was no desire to chill unionism, therefore Darlington does not
apply.
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965) (discussed in text accompanying notes 49, 50 supra). The Board rendered its decision
in this case subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Fibreboard but prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Darlington; thus there was no language in
the Board decision concerning the Darlington "absolute right" concept. On appeal,
however, the Court of Appeals again delved into both areas. It overruled the
Board as to the latter's interpretation of 'ibreboard (see notes 49, 50 supra).
As to the application of Darlington, the appellate court noted the Trial Examiner
had determined that the employer's business operations in Omaha were entirely
terminated and that such decision was motivated solely by economic considerations. The court stated that although the Trial Examiner's findings were made
in connection with an alleged 8(a) (3) violation, they would be equally applicable to an alleged 8(a) (5) violation. This finding of a lack of anti-union
motivation in closing the Omaha division precluded a finding of an 8(a) (5)
unfair labor practice under the auspices of the Darlington decision. The employer's failure to bargain concerning the effects of the decision was not properly presented in the complaint.
•NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d 1965) (see
text accompanying notes 51, 52 supra). The appellate court discarded the Darlington theory summarily, reasoning that since there was no union animus,
Darlington does not apply. In a footnote, the appellate court stated that had
there been discriminatory motives in the partial closing, management's actions
would have been prohibited and it would have committed an 8(a) (5) unfair
labor practice for not bargaining its decision with the union. Interestingly
enough, management subsequently decided to close its other plant, thereby completely terminating its business operations. This unilateral decision by management was not contested by the union, perhaps because the union felt that management's "absolute right" to terminate its business totally includes the right to
do so wtihout bargaining its decision. Once it was determined that Darlington
had no application, the court proceeded to distinguish the case on its facts from
Fibreboard, thereby rendering the Fibreboard doctrine inapplicable as concerns
the. employer's actual. decision; the employer . was still required to bargain- concerning the effects of his decision,
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tinguishable from Darlington,the courts of appeals, have applied
the Fibreboarddoctrine to determine whether the employer violated his 8 (a) (5) bargaining obligation.
On the basis of these decisions by the Board and the courts-,
it appears that management has the benefit of the "absolute
right" concept only when motivated by anti-union considerations it decides to totally terminate its operations; the "absolute.
right" concept has been deemed inapplicable to managerial decisions to partially terminate the operations8 81 and as, concernsmanagerial decisions not tainted by union animus.8 9 In ascertaining whether the closing was partial rather than total, the
applicable test is undoubtedly that announced in Darlington:
Does the party exercising control over the plant which is being
closed for anti-union purposes stand to reap a benefit from the
discouragement of unionism in either the business, if it should
be reopened or continued elsewhere, or in any other business in
which he has an interest?'
it is yet uncertain what benefits to management are encompassed within the "absolute right" concept. It definitely grants
management the right to unilaterally terminate the business whether the decision is motivated by economic considerations,
capriciousness, or radical union animus- without fear of violating sections 8(a) (1) through (3) of the act. And although
no decision has yet met the issue whether the "absolute right"'
releases management from its statutory collective bargaining
obligation, it is submitted that the concept is sufficiently broad
to encompass unilateral managerial decisions.' There have been
indications however, that notwithstanding management's "absolute right" to terminate the operations totally, management must,
negotiate with the union, upon request, concerning the effects
of such a decision. 91 Thus it appears that Darlington's"absolute
88. See note 84 8upra.
89. See note 87 supra.
90. It is logical to state, as did the Board in NLRB v. Royal Plating and
Poseing Co. (see text accompanying note 85 supra), that since anti-union
managerial decisions to teiminate the operations totally do not fall within the
scope of sections, 8(a) (1) through (3), they should not fall within the scope of

section 8(a) (5)

-at

least to the extent, that management is not-required to

negotiate concerning its actual decision.

91. It is well settled that whenever management is obligated; to: bargain Collectively concerning its. decision on a certain matter, this bargaining must include- negotiation of the effects this decision will have upon its employees, within
the respective bargaining unit. It now appears the. Board and the reviewing
courts will require management to negotiate with the union concerning the effects
its decisions upon tl
employeep even though the. Act may, not require Ae.oti-

ef
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right" concept will not completely negate the application of the
Fibreboard doctrine - that collective bargaining may possibly
mitigate the adverse effects of a managerial decision upon the
employees - to a management decision to totally terminate the

enterprise.
Managerial decisions to terminate the operations partially
and purely economic or capricious managerial decisions to terminate the enterprise totally appear to be excluded from the benefits of the "absolute right" concept. As concerns the former, it
has been seen that a decision to terminate partially which is
92
based upon union animus constitutes a violation of the act.
Furthermore, a purely economic decision to terminate partially

Is subject to the Fibreboard doctrine and failure to bargain
collectively concerning the decision constitutes violation of section 8 (a) (5).98

It should be noted that extension of the Fibre.

board doctrine into this area of managerial decisions has not
9 4 the Board
been without exceptions. In New York Mirror,
tion of the decision itself. See, e.g., NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing Co.,
350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); Cumberland Shoe Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 103,
61 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1966); Young Motor Truck Service, 156 N.L.R.B. No. 56,
61 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1966); New York Mirror, 151 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 58 L.R.R.M.
1465 (1965).
92. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
93. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir.
1965) ; NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
94. 151 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 58 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1965). Although the Board
acknowledged that the statutory right of a union to bargain conccrning changes
in terms and conditions of employment may be waived, it stated that such a
waiver is not to be lightly inferred, rather it must be clear and unmistakable.
In the instant case, the mere existence of severance and termination pay provisions in juxtaposition with the zipper clause in the collective bargaining agreement was insufficient to indicate a waver.
The Board acknowledged that in determining the parties' contractual intent,
one is not restricted to the contract provisions themselves, but may properly
evaluate them against the elucidating background of their bargaining history
(citing Kennecott Copper, see notes 55, 56 supra). Thus, for example, if it
were to appear that in full exploration of the subject during prior negotiations
the union had consciously yielded their interest to be notified about the permanent suspension of the Mirror's operations in return for the severance and
termination provisions, a finding of a clear and unmistakable waiver might well
be justified (citing Shell Oil Company, see note 57 supra).
The Board nevertheless found that management had not violated the Act by
unilaterally deciding to sell and close down this printing operation. The Board
was mindful of the Supreme Court's oft-quoted statement in NLRB v. Katz,
369 U.S. 736 (1962), to the effect that even--though unilateral action by an
employer without prior discussion with the union is contrary to congressional
policy, this does not foreclose the possibility that there might be circumstances
which the Board could or should accept as excusing or justifying such unilateral
action. The Board was satisfied that circumstances existed here. The employer
was motivated solely by pressing economic necessity; there was no evidence of
any union. animus; sale and cessation of business have permanently abolished
all unit work and union is here not setking rinstatement of the employees; tbe
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recognized that the statutory right of a union to bargain concerning changes in terms and conditions of employment and,
more specifically, a managerial decision partially to terminate
its business enterprise, may be waived. In Young Motor Truck
Service,95 the employer, motivated solely by economic considerations and without union animus, unilaterally sold his oil-trucking operation and relocated his minor sand-trucking operation
pending efforts to sell it. The Board held that the employer did
not violate the act by failing to negotiate such decisions because
the union apparently acquiesced in the closing and waived its
rights to negotiate on the decision itself. However, it was held
that the employer must bargain with the union, upon request,
concerning the effects of the decision upon the employees. It is
submitted that the Board, in the process of extending the Fibreboard doctrine to include managerial decisions concerning partial termination of operations, will recognize each exception to
the doctrine that it has previously recognized in the area of subcontracting. 6 Some exceptions,97 however, were enunciated by
appellate courts and have not yet been endorsed by the Board
or the Supreme Court. The judicious employer should refrain

from perfecting a unilateral decision to terminate his business
partially unless the facts of the case fall precisely within one
of the exceptions recognized by the Board or there is an opportunity for review of the employer's actions in a Circuit which
recognizes relevant exceptions.9 8 Even if the facts of the case
union and the employer have had a long and effective bargaining relationship
which has resulted in contractual settlement of the employees' severance pay
and termination rights in the event of abolition of unit jobs, and the employer
met and bargained with the union concerning the effects of the shutdown.
95. 156 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 61 L.R.R.M. 1099 (1966). The employer owned two
trucking operations. Ie was insolvent and unless the Interstate Commerce Commission approved his application to sell, immediate bankruptcy would result. The
employer had no anti-union motivations. He notified his employees that his
entire business was for sale; however, the union did not request bargaining concerning the proposed discontinuance. With ICC approval the employer then sold
the oil-truck operation and unilaterally relocated his minor sand-truck operation
pending efforts to sell it also.
See also Cumberland Shoe Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 103, 61 L.R.R.M. 1194
(1966), in which the employer found it economically necessary to terminate one
of his two plants. The Board held there was no violation by closing the plant
and discharging the employees because there was no union animus and the employer gave the union adequate notice and opportunity to discuss relevant maiters
pertaining to the shutdown.
96. The Board has recognized exceptions a through d. See text accompanying
notes 55-58 supra.
97. Exceptions f through g. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
98. The Board has at its disposal several rather harsh remedies should the
employer fail to fulfill his collective bargaining obligations (see note 63 supra).
Fortunately, in this area of Mlanagement Decisions Concerning PortW or Total
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fit within a recognized exception, thereby allowing management
to perfect such a unilateral decision, management is apparently
obligated to negotiate the effects of the decision. 99
A managerial decision to completely terminate the enterprise, based purely upon economic or capricious considerations,
is excluded from the benefits of the "absolute right" doctrine.
Furthermore, it appears that the Board intends to subject such
a decision to the Fibreboard doctrine.?° If the assumption that
management need not bargain concerning an anti-union decision
to terminate the operations totally is correct, 101 then there exists
the anomalous and inequitable situation that an employer may
freely decide to terminate his entire enterprise in order to discourage organized labor, but may not decide to go out of business solely for economic reasons without first consulting the
union, unless the case falls within an exception to the Fibreboard
doctrine. It is submitted that management should have the unfettered right to terminate its operations completely regardless
of its motives. In accord with this view, the anomaly may be
dissolved by either extending the "absolute right" concept to include economic decisions to terminate totally, and thereby bar
application of the Fibreboarddoctrine, or by allowing continued
Termination of Business Operations the Board and the reviewing courts have
evidenced a propensity to refrain from imposing the extremely harsh remedy of
resumption of the operations. In NLRB v. American Manufacturing Co. of
Texas, 351 F.2d 74, enforcing in part, mod. in part, 139 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962),
the appellate court ordered reinstatement of the employees with back pay; however, it refused to order the employer to reacquire a fleet of trucks and all the
related equipment necessary to operate a large transportation department. In
Apex Linen Service, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 58 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1965), the
Board held that since the shutdown was economically motivated, the employer
was not required to resume the operations or reinstate the employees.
99. See note 91 supra.
100. New York Mirror, discussed in text accompanying note 72, 73, 94 supra,
definitely implies that the F,'ibreboard doctrine applies to a managerial decision
to terminate the operations totally for purely economic reasons. New York
Mirror was decided by the Board ten days before the Supreme Court enunciated
the "absolute right" concept in Darlington. And upon initial observation it might
be argued that the "absolute right" concept negates the employer's obligation
imposed by Fibreboard. However, since the appellate courts have refused to extend the "absolute right" concept to include purely economically motivated decisions by management, perhaps the Board's implications in New York Mirror
still have value. Young Motor Truck Service, 156 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 61 L.R.R.M.
1099 (1966) (see text accompanying note 95 supra), was decided subsequently
to Darlington. The employer, in the process of completely terminating his business operations, perfected several unilateral decisions without prior negotiation
with the employees. The Board held there was no unfair labor practice because
the union had waived its right to bargain collectively, thus implying that management is obligated to negotiate concerning its economic, decisions to terminate completely its operations.
101. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
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application of the Fibreboard doctrine in theory, but adopting
the exception announced by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit that the Fibreboard doctrine does not require management to bargain concerning a decision which lies at the core
of entrepreneurial control. 102 Regardless of whether management must bargain concerning its decision to terminate its operations completely, the Fibreboarddoctrine presumably requires
negotiation of the effects of such decision. 10 3
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS CONCERNING AUTOMATION AND
RELOCATION OF WORK

The principles underlying the Town & Country and Fibreboard decisions, developed and applied in the areas of subcontracting and termination, seem to be equally applicable to other
types of managerial decisions that affect terms and other conditions of employment. Indeed, shortly after its decision in Town
& Country, the Board, in Renton News Record,0 4 held that the
employer violated section 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain with
the union concerning his decision to induce automation and the
effects of such change upon his employees. The doctrine suggested in Town & Country and later firmly established in Fibreboard was also applied in the Renton decision: "the adverse effects of changes brought about due to improved, and even radically changed, methods and equipment, could at least be partially
dissipated by timely advance planning by the employer and the
bargaining representative of its employees."' 1 5 As it was stated
in Fibreboard:"[A] Ithough it is not possible to say whether a
satisfactory solution could be reached, national labor policy is
102. This language from Royal lating d Polishing Company has been incorporated into exception f, see text accompanying note 60 supra.
103. See note 91 supra.
104. 136 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1962). In NLRB v. Northwestern Publishing Co.,
146 N.L.R.B. 457 (1964), afI'd, 343 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1965), the appellate
court affirmed the Board's decision that the employer committed an 8(a) (5)
violation in unilaterally changing his bundle delivery system without first affording the representative of his employees an opportunity to bargain collectively

concerning his decision.

It is submitted, however, that the importance of this

decision is mitigated because the employer was also found guilty of an 8(a) (3)

violation. It must be remembered that whenever the employer is. driven by antiunion motivations, the Board and the reviewing courts have no difficulty in
finding that he has failed to fulfill 8(a) (5)'s requirement: bargain collectively in
good faith. However, the existence of union animus precludes the Board or re
viewing court from ever reaching the question whether or not the case falls
within Fibrcboard and its progency.

See notes 5, 22 supra. Had there been no

union animus iJnNoqrthweqtern perhaps the court would have found there was no
8(a)(5) violation because the decision lay at the core of entrepreneurial control.
105. Id. at 1297.
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founded upon the congressional determination that the chances
are good enough to warrant subjecting such issues to the process
of collective bargaining."' 10 6
A managerial decision to relocate business operations necessarily implies a decision to terminate business operations partially or totally at the original situs. A decision to terminate
operations without relocating the work elsewhere should be distinguished from a managerial decision to relocate work at a different situs; the former has already been discussed. 10 7'
As late as 1961, in NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 0 8 the Board.
and the reviewing courts held that an employer, motivated by
economic considerations alone, did not have to bargain collectively concerning his unilateral decision to relocate business operations because it was an activity clearly within the realm of
managerial discretion and not within the purview of "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." It was
asserted, however, that once the decision was perfected, the employer must give notice to the union so the negotiators could
consider the treatment due those employees whose employment
was affected. On the other hand, remedial action was forthcoming whenever the Board determined that the decision to relocate,
the, business operations was actually a "runaway shop," a situation where the employer, owing to anti-union motivations, transfers his work to another plant or opens a new plant in another
locality to replace his closed plant. 0 9
As might have been expected, the Board, guided by the Fibreboard doctrine, has recently expanded management's collective
bargaining obligation to include purely economic decisions con106. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 214 (1964).
107. See Management Decisions Concerning Partial or Total Termination of
Business Operations, p. 648 supra.
108. 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961), enforcing, 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960).
109. See, e.g., NLRB v. Preston Feed Corp., 309 F.2d 346 (4th Cir 1962)
Sidele FIshions, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B. 547 (1961), enf. sub. noma., Garment Workers
v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B.
162 (1957), enf. sub. nom., NLRB v. Mackneish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959) ;
Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 480 (1953), enf. den., 211 F.2d 365
(4th Cir. 1954) ; NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Gerity
Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941), enf. per curiam, 137 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.
1942) ; Martel Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1940), denying
enforcement, 20 N.L.R.B. 712 (1940) ; NLRB v. Union Pacific Stages, Inc., 99
F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1938); Telcom, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 84 (1965) ; Allied
Chem. Corp. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, 153 NLRB No. 71. (1965);
Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (1965) ; Rome Products Co., 77 N.L.R.B.
1217 (1948).
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cerning the relocation of its business operations. Standard Handkerchief Co. 110 held that the employer violated section 8 (a) (5)
by proceeding unilaterally and failing to disclose to the union a
contemplated plant transfer. The Board further asserted that
the employer also erred in failing to negotiate the effects such
decision would have upon his employees.
Manifestly, the Board has extended the general Fibreboard
doctrine to include managerial decisions concerning both automation and relocation of work. Again it appears that this extension will not be without exceptions. In InternationalShoe Co."'
the employer was deemed not to have violated section 8(a) (5)
of the act even though he not only denied the truth of rumors
concerning the proposed transfer of the plant facilities, but also
refused to bargain such decision once the truth became known.
The Board, using reasoning akin to that in Shell Oil Co.,"12 held
that, owing to union acquiescence in prior management decisions
concerning business changes 13 and to the language of the collective bargaining agreement," 4 the union had granted management the right to act unilaterally in this area. Thus it appears
the Board is pursuing a procedure similar to that followed in
the area of subcontracting: imposition of certain limitations
upon management's general bargaining obligation in order to
prevent the collective bargaining obligation from completely destroying management's entrepreneurial control. Presumably
this will result in the Board eventually embracing all of the exceptions recognized by it under the Fibreboarddoctrine as applied to the area of subcontracting. As pointed out above,"*5
however, the Board at present has acknowledged only certain
exceptions ;,16 others have been announced by appellate courts.
110. 151 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1965). See also Spun-Jee Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. No.
96, 59 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1965).
111. 151 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (1965).
112. See note 57 8upra.
113. The various changes made by the company in its operations prior to 1962
were with the apparent acquiescence of the union and are indicative of the fact
that at least until that time the union regarded such changes as a matter of
management prerogative.
114. Until 1962 the collective bargaining agreement contained a management
rights clause which had been interpreted by an arbitrator as granting management the right to relocate its work at its discretion. During the 1963 contract
negotiations the union insisted upon proposals restricting the employer's right to
relocate the work load. However, ultimately the union withdrew its proposals
and agreed to the employer's proposals, thus abandoning, apparently in exchange
for other terms granted by the employer, its efforts to obtain restrictions on'the
employer's right to make unilateral changes in the operations.
115. See text accompanying. notes 55-58, 63, 96 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 59-61, 97 supra.
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Until the Board or the reviewing courts announce more explicit
guidelines in this matter, management is in a precarious position"1 7 in perfecting a unilateral decision concerning either automation or relocation of work when the facts of the case do not
fall within the acknowledged exceptions. And even though management may not be obligated to bargain collectively concerning
the actual decision to automate or relocate, it will be obliged to
negotiate concerning theeffects of such decision."18
CONCLUSION"

9

The controversy concerning what subjects should be included
within the framework of collective bargaining brings into focus
the conflicting rights of management to retain unfettered control
of its business and the rights of its employees to organize and
bargain collectively on issues affecting their livelihood and welfare. The line between mandatory and voluntary subjects of collective bargaining defines matters which management must discuss and therefore describes the reach of union influence through
economic pressure. It determines the business decisions that
shall be subjected to mutual control and thus resolved by economic contest between management and labor. Since the unions,
under pressure of political, economic, and sociological advances,
continually strive to bring new subjects within the purview of
.mandatory collective bargaining, and management, by instinct,
Vigorously resists erosion of its unilateral control of the enterprise, it is easy to understand why the scope of managerial pre117. If the employer unilaterally decides to relocate his operations and is
later deemed to have violated section 8(a) (5) of the act, the Board has the
power to order the employer to bargain with the union concerning whether the
work should -be relocated and under what conditions; create preferential hiring
lists containing, in order of seniority, name's of employees fired when the unilateral decision was perfected ; offer unconditonal reinstatement to employees
named in the hiring list in the new operations; reinstate all employees who notify
employer of desire for reinstatement; reimburse each reinstated employee for

necessary travel expenses; pay back wages. See Standard Handkerchief Co., 151
N.L.R.B. No. 2, 58 L.R.R.M. 1339 (1965).
Application of the remedies suggested by Fibreboard and its progeny

managerial decision to automate which is in violation of Section 8(a) (5)

to a

would

perhaps result in a Board order to resume the operations in its original form and
reinstate the former employees with back wages.
118. See note 91 supra. See also NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., discussed in
text accompanying note 108 supra; Standard Handkerchief Co., discussed in text
accompanying note 10 supra; Renton News Record, discussed in text accompanying note 104 supra.
119. Due to the nature of the law in this area, it should be noted that research

ceased March 1, 1966.
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rogatives has emerged as one of the bitterest issues in labor
relations.
Solution of this problem is not easy. It turns upon basic
policy considerations. in fact, it is but a step removed from the
initial determination whether there should be collective bargaining at all. Unfortunately, once it created the National Labor
Relations Act and thereby established collective bargaining as
the national policy for the settlement of labor-management disputes, Congress chose to remain silent as to which subjects fall
within the mandatory bargaining category. Thus the Board and
the reviewing courts have found themselves in the unenviable
position of being responsible for evolving the labor law, and
through it, the subordinate national labor policy in this area.
In attempting to ascertain which subjects fall within the
ambit of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," the Supreme Court in Fibreboardelected to reinforce
the policy that industrial conflict may be reduced by subjecting
labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of
collective bargaining. Thus it theorized that the adverse effects
on employees of the managerial decision to replace employees in
the bargaining unit with those of an independent contractor to
perform the same work Under similar conditions of employment could possibly be mitigated by the collective bargaining
process. However, the Court realized that unrestricted extension
and application of this policy would produce a situation where
labor is effectively installed as a co-partner in the management
of the business. This realization was evidenced by a desire to
exclude from the mandatory bargaining obligation those managerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court enunciated no specific
guidelines which would objectively determine whether a subject
fell within the mandatory bargaining category. It simply asserted that it is appropriate to look to industrial bargaining
practices in appraising the propriety of including a particular
subject within the scope of mandatory bargaining; industrial
experience is not only reflective of the interests of labor and
management in the subject matter but is also indicative of the
amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process.
Thus the Supreme Court left it to the Board and the reviewing
courts to create workable standards. This procedure was pre-
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sumably meant to result in viable rules which would function
in accord with a changing industrial society.
The National Labor Relations Board has since zealously followed the basic policy consideration of Fibreboard:that industrial strife may possibly be mitigated through application of the
collective bargaining process. The Board quickly extended the
bargaining obligation to include several classes of managerial
decisions originally thought to be employer prerogatives-decisions concerning relocation, automation, and termination. In
fact, the Board has consistently applied the collective bargaining
obligation to any managerial decision affecting employees unless
the employees have acted in such a manner as to indicate relinquishment of their right to bargain collectively. The Board has
undoubtedly been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by an
awareness of severe economic hardship upon labor resulting
from automation, plant relocation, and other recent technological advances. It apparently feels that if the parties will collectively bargain any managerial decision affecting the employees,
a satisfactory solution may be discovered. Commendable as this
may be, the Board, in attempting to ameliorate all labor-management problems through forced bargaining, is introducing new
rigidity into a delicate economic situation. In order to compete
in highly dynamic industrial society, management should not be
unreasonably hindered by the collective bargaining process. Negotiation of complex business decisions creates a substantial time
lag between stimulus and managerial action, thereby imposing
severe handicaps upon industrial efficiency and growth.
It is submitted that rather than enforce the collective bargaining obligation upon all managerial decisions affecting employees apart from situations in which the employees have relinquished their right to bargain, the Board and the reviewing
courts should adopt a more limited approach to the Fibreboard
doctrine - preferably an approach like that taken by the Courts
of Appeals for the Third and Eighth Circuits. The collective bargaining obligation should include only those managerial decisions
which affect the employees and do not significantly involve the
employer's right to manage his business or lie at the core of
entrepreneurial control.
Julian Clark Martin

